Why Retirees Need a Liquidity Reserve, Not a Bond Fund
Every autumn brings a fresh round of advice about getting out of the market for a while. Some of it rhymes. Some of it comes with charts. Almost none of it is useful, and the reason is worth understanding, because the same flaw runs through most market timing advice aimed at retirees.
The trouble with rules built on averages
"Sell in May and go away" is the best known of these, and it isn't fabricated. On average, May through September really has lagged November through April.
The trouble is how much work the phrase "on average" is doing. An average blends decades of specific years, each with its own crisis and its own recovery, into a composite that has never actually occurred. You don't get to invest in the composite. You get one specific year, and it rarely resembles the blend.
2026 is a reasonable example. Since May 1 the S&P 500 has returned roughly 6%, and it is up about 12% for the year. An investor who followed the rhyme spent the summer watching.
But the deeper problem with a calendar rule isn't that it missed this year. It's that it instructs you to act on a date rather than on conditions, and those two things almost never coincide.
Consider what actually forms a market bottom. A bottom is not a price level and certainly not a date. It is the point at which selling exhausts itself. Markets stop falling when the last motivated seller has finished selling, which is another way of saying that the people who sell into weakness are the ones who create the low everyone else later admires.
That isn't a criticism. Most of that selling is entirely rational at the individual level. Someone needed the money that month. Someone had watched their statement shrink for nine months. Someone followed a rule that said autumn was dangerous.
It does, however, clarify what you are agreeing to when you adopt a seasonal rule. You are committing in advance to sell on a date that has nothing to do with price, nothing to do with value, and nothing to do with your own circumstances.
The one autumn pattern worth watching
Not all seasonal observations are equally empty. Midterm election years have a genuine record behind them, and unlike the May rhyme, there is a mechanism that explains it.
The second year of a presidential term is when policy direction is most genuinely uncertain. Markets price uncertainty poorly, and resolution tends to arrive with the election. That is a reason for the pattern to exist, which is more than seasonality can usually offer.
The record since 1986:
Midterm year | Max drawdown | Date of low | Next 12 months |
1986 | -9.4% | Sept. 29 | +39.9% |
1990 | -19.9% | Oct. 11 | +29.1% |
1994 | -8.9% | Apr. 4 | +15.1% |
1998 | -19.3% | Aug. 31 | +37.9% |
2002 | -33.8% | Oct. 9 | +33.7% |
2006 | -7.7% | June 13 | +23.9% |
2010 | -16.0% | July 2 | +31.0% |
2014 | -7.4% | Oct. 15 | +8.7% |
2018 | -19.8% | Dec. 24 | +37.1% |
2022 | -25.4% | Oct. 12 | +21.6% |
Source: Hartford Funds / Morningstar, S&P 500 Price Index.
Every one of the ten produced a real drawdown, averaging about 17%. From the low, the following twelve months averaged roughly 28%, positive in all ten cycles.
2022 is the clearest recent case. That autumn the advice was everywhere: wait for clarity, step aside until things settle. Plenty of people took it. Since a bottom is simply where selling exhausts itself, all of that stepping aside is precisely what produced one. It arrived on October 12. A year later the index was up about 22%.
Now look at the timing column. Eight of the ten lows came in the second half of the year and five in late September or October, which sounds tradable until you notice the full spread runs from April to December.
The cycle is dependable. The date is not. That distinction matters, because it rules out the obvious response. You cannot position for a low whose arrival you can only place within an eight month window.
As for 2026: the S&P fell 8.9% into March 30. If that proves to be the year's low, it would be the earliest bottom of any midterm year since 1986 and tied for the third shallowest. It is possible. 1994 bottomed in April and never looked back. It is simply not the way to plan.
Why retirement changes the arithmetic
Here is where most advice quietly fails people who have stopped working.
While you are accumulating, a decline is a discount. Money goes in every paycheck, so a bear market buys your next thirty contributions at better prices. "Stay invested and ride it out" is correct, and the math is on your side.
Retirement inverts that completely. Thirty years of withdrawals with no new money coming in means every decline is a potential forced sale. You are not buying the dip. You are funding your life out of it.
This is a structural problem, not an emotional one, which is why "don't panic" fails as a solution. Nobody talks themselves out of needing money in a given month. Selling into a decline converts a temporary price into a permanent loss, and it does not matter whether fear or a plumbing bill caused it.
Sequence matters enormously here. Two retirees with identical average returns over thirty years can end up in completely different places depending on when the bad years arrive. Losses early in retirement, while withdrawals are being taken, do damage that later gains cannot fully repair.
What a reserve actually is
The fix is a dedicated liquidity reserve, funded before the drawdown rather than during it. We call ours the War Chest.
It holds a few years of portfolio withdrawals so that when markets fall you spend from the reserve and leave the portfolio alone. Two things follow. The math works, because you are not selling at the bottom. And the behavior works, because you are not watching next year's living expenses evaporate on a screen.
A fully funded reserve does something further. It converts a sell-off from a threat into an opportunity, because you can put a little of it to work at lower prices and refill it from gains later. That option only exists if the reserve was built beforehand.
A bond fund is not a reserve. Bond funds deliver duration, which is a polite name for interest rate risk. Duration and safety are not the same thing, and recent years have made that an expensive lesson. The core US bond index fell 13% in 2022, its worst year on record, at exactly the moment retirees needed it to hold. It is down about 3% since the end of June this year while stocks are up.
A real reserve is money you can draw on any day, in any market, with confidence, because protecting the principal is its first job. What it earns while waiting is a distant second. In practice that means short duration instruments: Treasury bills, floating rate notes, ultra short income strategies, and a measured allocation to defined outcome and volatility harvesting strategies that accept a variable return in exchange for a floor. Variable is acceptable. Negative is not.
How much. Size it against portfolio withdrawals, not total spending. If a household spends $120,000 a year and $50,000 arrives from Social Security and a pension, the portfolio is funding $70,000. Three years of that is $210,000, which on a $2 million portfolio is about 10%. The right number depends on how much of your income is already guaranteed and how much volatility you can live with, but that is the arithmetic.
Sized properly, the reserve makes the question of where the market bottoms largely academic. You will not need to know, because you will not be forced to care.
That is the whole point. Not predicting the low, but arranging your affairs so that its timing cannot hurt you, and so that if the opportunity does arrive, you